The nature of this new doctrine was to be political. That turn of events prompted Trotsky's replacement by Frunze in January 1925. Frunze's position eventually found favour with the officer elements that had experienced the poor command and control of Soviet forces in the conflict with Poland during the Polish–Soviet War. The call prompted opposition by Leon Trotsky. In the aftermath of the wars with Japan and Poland several senior Soviet Commanders called for a unified military doctrine. Others came later, particularly Nikolai Varfolomeev (1890–1939) and Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931), who made significant contributions to the use of technology in deep offensive operations. Many of these officers entered the Soviet Military Academy during Tukhachevsky's tenure as its commandant in 1921–1922. They promoted the development of military scientific societies and identified groups of talented officers. Primary advocates of the development included Alexander Svechin (1878–1938), Mikhail Frunze (1885–1925), and Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893–1937).
Once that had been achieved, the Soviets turned their attention to solving the problem of military operational mobility. It still relied on the country's enormous manpower reserves however, the Soviet program to develop heavy industry, which began in 1929, also raised the technical standards of Soviet arms industries to the level of other European nations. The new Red Army (founded in 1918) combined the old and new methods. Īfter the Russian Revolution of 1917, the new Bolshevik regime sought to establish an entirely new military system that reflected the Bolshevik revolutionary spirit.
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However, despite some notable victories in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) and in various Russo-Turkish Wars, Russian defeats in the Crimean War (1853–1856), Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and First World War (1914–1918), together with a series of Soviet defeats at the hands of Poland in the Polish–Soviet War (1919–1921), highlighted the inferiority of Russian methodology in organisation and training. The Russian Empire had kept pace with its enemies and allies and performed well in its major conflicts in the run-up to the 19th century. Russian military thinking had changed little over the course of three centuries prior to the 1920s. Unlike most other doctrines, deep battle stressed combined arms cooperation at all levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The goal of a deep operation was to inflict a decisive strategic defeat on the enemy's logistical abilities and render the defence of their front more difficult, impossible or irrelevant. Deep battle envisaged the breaking of the enemy's forward defenses, or tactical zones, through combined arms assaults, which would be followed up by fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves sent to exploit the strategic depth of an enemy front. Deep operations had two phases: the tactical deep battle, followed by the exploitation of tactical success, known as the conduct of deep battle operations. Using these templates, the Soviets developed the concept of deep battle, and by 1936, it had become part of the Red Army Field Regulations. The Soviet Union was the first country to officially distinguish the third level of military thinking which occupied the position between strategy and tactics. This new approach considered military strategy and tactics, but also introduced a new intermediate level of military art: operations. In the aftermath of several failures or defeats in the Russo-Japanese War, First World War and Polish–Soviet War, the Soviet High Command ( Stavka) focused on developing new methods for the conduct of war. The concept of deep operations was a national strategy, tailored to the economic, cultural and geopolitical position of the Soviet Union. The term comes from Vladimir Triandafillov, an influential military writer, who worked with others to create a military strategy with its own specialized operational art and tactics. It was a tenet that emphasized destroying, suppressing or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the line of contact but also throughout the depth of the battlefield. Deep operation ( Russian: Глубокая операция, glubokaya operatsiya), also known as Soviet Deep Battle, was a military theory developed by the Soviet Union for its armed forces during the 1920s and 1930s.
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